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Abstract
The rise of public sector unions is one of the most significant but least examined
movements for legal rights and social change. Through the 1950s, government employees
typically had no right to bargain collectively or even to organize unions–rights often regarded as
fundamental human rights–and public sector unions were small and relatively powerless. Yet
today, unions represent more than 40 percent of all public workers, government employees make
up about 40 percent of the entire U.S. labor movement, and public sector unions are among the
strongest political advocacy groups in the country. This became possible only through a
revolution of reform in state legislation in the past forty years: state laws that grant public
workers the right to organize and bargain collectively. This sea-change in law and politics and
the accompanying vast expansion of a social movement is notable in that it was done neither
through federal laws nor a Supreme Court decision, but rather through state statutes and political
action. In this era of federalism, such mechanisms of legal reform deserve increased scrutiny.
Using archival documents of the groups involved, this article analyzes the first political
victory on this issue: Wisconsin’s public sector laws of 1959 and 1962. These laws created the
first state statute to grant organizing and collective bargaining rights to public employees. The
passage of this law required a decade-long battle over ideas, political power, and legal doctrines.
The article traces this struggle in all of these arenas, describing how the interaction of theory,
evolving societal norms, and political muscle started a wave of reform in a crucial area: the legal
regulation of a social and economic movement. The result was a fundamental turning point in
the legal rights of workers in this country and in American politics. It is also a case study of how
significant social and political change can be accomplished at the level of state statutes.
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Of all the movements for legal rights and political power in the second half of the
twentieth century, one of the most significant but least examined has been the rise of public
sector labor unions. Well into the 1950s, government employees in the United States typically
had no right to bargain collectively or even to organize into unions–rights often regarded as
fundamental human rights2–and public sector unions were small and relatively powerless. Yet
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As James Gross has explained, Article 23 (4) of the United Nation’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights issued in1948 includes the right to form and join unions. Article
22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United States ratified in
1992, incorporates the language of the Universal Declaration: “Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.” And Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
2

today, more than 40 percent of all public workers are represented by unions; government
employees make up about 40 percent of the entire American labor movement; and public sector
unions are among the strongest political advocacy groups, on both national and local political
levels, in the country.3
This became possible only through a revolution of reform in state legislation in the past
forty years: state laws that grant government employees the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Public sector labor laws developed much later and more unevenly than did private
sector law. While many private sector workers won the right to organize, bargain, and strike in
the 1930s with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),4 such rights did not even begin to be
granted in the public sector until the 1960s (even today, about twenty states deny bargaining
rights to most or all public workers).5 Yet when public sector unions began winning the rights to
organize and bargain, it resulted in decades of successful union organization that has no parallel
in any form of employment in U.S. history.

Cultural Rights also affirms the “right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union
of his choice.” James A. Gross, Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations
Law: a Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP POLICY J. 65
(1999), at 71-72.
3

See, e.g., Gregory Saltzman, Bargaining Laws as a Cause and a Consequence of the
Growth of Teacher Unionism, 38 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 335 (1985); Vijay
Kapoor, Public Sector Labor Relations: Why it Should Matter to the Public and to Academia 5
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 401 (2003) (the “political clout” of public sector unions is “quite
great,” and “one could argue that the political power that public sector unions now enjoy would
never have existed but for their right to collectively bargain”), id. at 407 & n. 29.
4

29 U.S. C. § 151, et seq., 49 Stat. 449 (1935).

5

See RICHARD KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (3d ed. 2001), 58-59.
3

This sea-change in law and politics and the accompanying vast expansion of a social
movement was aided by the law, but in a different way than the more familiar narratives of other
previously disempowered groups. While legal scholarship often focuses more on fights for
rights that end in courtroom victories, from Brown v. Bd. of Education6 through Lawrence v.
Texas,7 or federal legislation such as the NLRA or Title VII,8 public workers won their fight
through statutes, not the courts, and in state legislatures, not at the federal level. In this era of
federalism, such mechanisms of legal reform deserve increased scrutiny.
This article analyzes the first political and legal victory on this issue: Wisconsin’s public
sector laws of 1959 and 1962. These laws created the first state statute to grant organizing and
collective bargaining rights to public employees. The passage of this law required a decade-long
battle over ideas, political power, and legal doctrine. The result was a fundamental turning point
in the legal rights of workers in this country and in American politics. It is also a case study of
how significant social and political change can be accomplished at the level of state statutes.
The fight in Wisconsin was won primarily by local bodies of AFSCME, today the largest
public sector union in America. Union advocates encountered a range of objections that were
steeped in history and indeed still resonate somewhat today: real and alleged differences
between public and private employment; a fear of strikes and “divided loyalty,” especially by
police; constitutional doctrines involving state structure and sovereignty; and concerns over
labor’s influence on government. Unions employed a range of political tactics common not only
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to labor law reform but to legal reforms of all kinds: “bottom up” pressure on candidates and
officeholders; a contest of ideas fought in the context of attitudes made more hospitable to
reform by actual practices on the ground; gradual erosion of outdated legal rules; and a seminal
victory that sparked change across the nation.
This is the story of that seminal victory. Part One traces the evolving context in which
the battle was waged. A prerequisite for legal reform is evolving attitudes toward a subject in the
broader society. The 1950s saw an increasing acceptance of public sector union rights in various
popular, professional, and academic circles. This change was necessary but not sufficient:
courts still rejected any legal rights for public sector unions. This Part also describes the growth
of public sector unions, including AFSCME and Wisconsin’s political history. Part Two studies
the various failed attempts at passing a public sector labor statute, beginning in 1951, focusing
on the types of objections reformers needed to overcome and what it took–in terms of political
strategies, advocacy of ideas, and legislative compromises–to get the final laws passed. Part
Three discusses the passage of the 1959 bill, its successes and problems. Part Four studies the
1962 bill and continuing legal issues in this area, and draws some conclusions about the nature of
legal reform.
I. The Context for Reform.
A. Evolving Views of Public Sector Unions.
For labor as a whole, the 1950s in some ways featured unequaled successes. Overall
union density climbed to nearly 35 percent, an all-time high. In some senses, private sector
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unions now were now viewed as a legitimate part of the economic order, and courts routinely
enforced the rights of private workers to organize, bargain, and strike.9 Yet public sector
workers still lacked the basic rights to bargain and even to organize that private sector workers
had won two decades earlier.
This lag was largely due to a prevailing attitude that public sector unions were entirely
different from private sector unions. As one court put it, rejecting public employees’ claim for
the right to organize, “Nothing can be gained by comparing public employment with private
employment; there can be no analogy in such a comparison.”10 Notably, the prospect of public
workers striking horrified judges, and those judges assumed that granting the right to organize
and bargain would necessarily mean that government employees would strike. This was true
despite the facts that both AFL and CIO public sector unions had renounced the right to strike,
and public sector strikes after the infamous Boston police strike of 1919 were small and rare.11
On the other hand, by the 1950s, outside courtrooms, public sector unions were winning
increased acceptance. The growth of government and civil service rules had created more
professionalized public sector management, reflected in publications such as Public Personnel
Review.12 Discussions of the role of unions had become more realistic. An essay in the 1946
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book Elements of Public Administration argued that while collective bargaining would have to
take “different forms” in government employment, there was “considerable room for
constructive participation of unions in grievance procedures and work relations generally.”
Another essayist decried the old “authoritarian attitude” of government managers simply
invoking governmental sovereignty as an excuse not to bargain. A third author pointed out that
the sheer number of union members made them “an important facet of personnel administration.”
This article also critiqued the notion that unions could not be allowed in government for fear of
loss of public services, noting that private sector workers in utilities, transportation, and food
industries could strike. In addition, it argued that the government had some authority to bargain,
and it rejected the idea that unionized public workers would be biased in labor disputes.13
Academics increasingly stressed the similarities between private and public sector
workers. Morton Godine wrote in 1951 that public employees “are essentially wage earners”
with the same economic interests and desire for a voice in their working conditions as private
sector workers. Rollin Posey agreed in 1956 that “the essence of unionism in the public service–
as in private employment–is the endeavor to improve wages, hours, and working conditions.”
Harry Rains, a professor of industrial relations at Hofstra University, argued that public workers
were “entitled to rights similar to those enjoyed by the rest of the working population.” Godine
quoted Franklin Roosevelt’s observation that the desire of public employees for reasonable pay,
hours, and working conditions “is basically no different from that of employees in private
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industry.” Irving Bernstein, then associate director of the University of California Institute of
Industrial Relations, explained in 1959 that public sector unions were “going through the same
struggle for the right to organize and bargain collectively as unions in private industry were
going through in the early ’30s.”14
A huge obstacle to legal reform in this area had been fears dating from the disastrous
Boston police strike of 1919. While this issue had not gone away, the most dire predictions were
somewhat muted by the reality that, in the following several decades, public sector unions rarely
struck. “The power of a strike lies at the root of all suspicion of public unions,” the Providence
Evening Bulletin editorialized in 1957, but it added that in exchange for a bar on strikes, public
sector unions should have binding mediation and arbitration to settle bargaining impasses. A
related fear, that public employees, especially police, would side with striking private sector
workers, had also proven unfounded. Godine explained that “the fear that unity with trade
unions in private industry will lead to sympathetic strikes. . . has not been supported by
experience.”15 Still, these concerns were far from dead, as debates in Wisconsin would show.
Mainstream organizations showed similar evolving attitudes. In the 1950s, the National
Civil Service League endorsed the right of government employees to organize. In 1959, the
ACLU issued a statement arguing that public workers should have the right to organize,
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negotiate conditions of employment, and, except in essential services, strike. In 1955, the
American Bar Association’s Section on Labor Relations Law declared that public employees
should have the right to organize, and that statutory bars on organizing, negotiating, and even
striking were “not satisfactory approaches.” Again, however, the precise solution was unclear.
The ABA concluded that wherever “practicable,” rights in the private sector should be extended
to the public sector, “modified to meet the unique needs of the public service.”16
Even some public employers were becoming more amenable. A 1950 study of public
administrators noted “an increased sense of responsibility on the part of unions.” In a nod to the
reality that public sector workers were organizing even in the absence of formal rights to do so,
the International City Managers’ Association (ICMA), observed that the emergence of municipal
unions would “have to be dealt with” and labeled AFSCME a “responsible” organization.
Employers were more tolerant of organizing than of bargaining or arbitration. Still, a 1958
report by the ICMA listed “guidelines for constructive negotiation” with unions and even
contained a call for state laws that would allow recognition and written bargaining agreements.
This was in part, as AFSCME national president Arnold Zander suggested, simply a result of the
persistence of organized public workers. “Unions are here to stay on the municipal level,” the
ICMA explained, “and it would be practical to recognize the fact.”17
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Thus began explorations of how labor law could be adjusted to fit the public sector.
Reformers stressed that the tights to organize and to do some bargaining were reasonable, but
their descriptions of how far to extend such rights and, especially, what to do if bargaining
reached impasse–remained unclear. Godine suggested that bargaining in some form was
“inevitable,” and he rejected a legal argument that various courts had accepted: that obliging
sovereign governments to bargain with private parties such as unions would violate
constitutional prohibitions on the non-delegation of state power. Also, while Godine agreed that
strikes by public workers should be barred, he argued that grievance machinery should be
created to resolve labor-management issues. Banning strikes alone was a “barren approach to a
critical problem.” His solution, however, was vague. Godine called for “a measure of employee
participation” less than full collective bargaining: “some system of collective consultation which
would recognize the right of public employees to share in the determination of their conditions of
employment.”18 Creating specific legal rules would be central in Wisconsin and in the
development of all modern public sector labor law.
B. Growth of the Public Sector and Unions.
Legal change is not exclusively or primarily about ideas, however, and it is extremely
unlikely that reform would have been successful without a strong national labor movement and
its very determined public sector membership. Overall, union membership had risen from about
3.6 million in 1929 to about 18 million in 1954. Moreover, by the later 1950s, government
employees were a growing part of labor. In 1956, there were 915,000 members of public sector
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unions; by 1964 there were 1,453,000, increasing the proportion of public workers in the labor
movement from 5.1 to 8.1 percent.19 Also, the leadership of the now-merged AFL-CIO had
become more supportive. The 1948 AFL national convention urged state federations to press for
state laws granting public workers “the same legal rights and privileges. . . now enjoyed by
other workers in organized labor.” AFSCME’s national journal, the Public Employee, claimed
that the “national AFL-CIO is taking an active interest” in public sector rights; “never before has
the word gone down from the top to every state.” In 1959, the AFL-CIO convention resolved to
make intensified efforts to pass laws guaranteeing organizing and bargaining rights.20
Also, the overall expansion of public employment contributed to the cause. From 1947 to
1956, the number of government workers nationally grew from 5.4 million to almost 7.3 million.
By 1962, the 8.8 million public employees were approximately one-eighth of the nation’s labor
force. Notably, this growth took place almost entirely in state and local government: from
3,560,000 workers in 1946 to 6,380,000 in 1962. This increased scale caused legislatures to give
administrators more authority to deal with public workers, which in turn made collective
bargaining seem more realistic.21
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The boom in state and local government employment greatly benefitted AFSCME, the
“Union of the Future,” according to an article in Business Week. “Industrial unions seem to be
at the end of a line. . . as more and more plants are automated,” the article explained, and
employment for craft unions “is growing only slowly. In public employment, however, there is
an “expanding reservoir of workers.” AFSCME would, the article accurately predicted,
eventually rival the Teamsters in size and influence. Similarly, the Christian Science Monitor
asked, “Is there another star for organized labor to hitch its wagon to?” There “lies outside
industry an entire untapped pool of potential union membership–local and state government
employees.” AFSCME “holds the inside track in this virgin territory.”22 And indeed, AFSCME
would be the most important union backing legal change.
C. Law and Practice in the 1950s.
The law lagged behind these trends considerably. By the mid-1950s, the biggest court
victory for public sector unions was still a lone, 1951 Connecticut Supreme Court decision,
Norwalk Teachers’ Association v. Bd. of Education.23 This case held that, if a public employer
had not prohibited it, organizing a union was legal and some very limited bargaining would not
violate constitutional anti-delegation rules. Norwalk did not allow any bargaining without the
employer’s permission, rejected most forms of arbitration, did not allow strikes, and stated that
an employer could always choose to bar even organizing. And it was good law only in
Connecticut. In 1958, the Arkansas Supreme Court became the first court to strike down a ban
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on organizing in the public sector. Ironically, Potts v. Hay24 held that the ban violated the
“right-to-work” clause in the state constitution, which provided that employment could not be
based on union membership or the lack thereof. Still, while these decisions gave a limited right
to organize, they did not allow public sector unions to actually do much of anything.
Helping to pave the way for reform, however, was a reality on the ground that was
increasingly different from the law on the books. Despite the absence of legal authority
permitting the practice, public sector negotiating, at least of informal agreements, was distinctly
on the rise. In 1946, a study found that ninety-seven cities had written agreements with
employee organizations. By 1957, AFSCME declared that it had “agreements” for 445 local
unions or councils (although that was out of more than 1,500 locals). The increasing disparity
between the law and practice focused attention on how and whether such contracts could be
enforced in light of delegation and related sovereignty concerns. The National Civil Service
League claimed that a city could join a union “not in a binding joint contract, but in a
memorandum, freely accepted,” which the employer would administer. The ABA argued that
negotiated agreements could bind governments pursuant only to an unequivocal grant of power
to the public employer in a statute.25 And whether arbitration should or could constitutionally be
allowed was still controversial.
Opponents of public sector union rights were numerous and influential. The anti-union
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers and its general counsel Charles Rhyne argued
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through the 1950s that without specific legislative authorization government workers could not
bargain at all, and that such authorization should not be granted. Private sector business interests
tended to agree. And these opponents of reform had real political power. In 1959, bills designed
to limit explicitly the rights of public sector unions were introduced in Georgia, North Carolina,
Texas, Tennessee, and Arkansas. The North Carolina bill became law, barring all public
employees from organizing and forbidding contracts or even “understandings”–written or oral–
between government employers and unions.26
Commentators noted the increasing discrepancy between law and reality. Edward Cling
argued that the “great deal of informal collective bargaining” in the public sector meant that “the
legalistic approach,” that collective bargaining contracts inevitably were improper delegations of
legislative power, “must be reviewed from a practical standpoint.” Posey wrote that the risk of
strikes in the public sector came from refusing to recognize unions, not from bargaining.
Fundamentally, public workers had created a reality on the ground that made their call for
bargaining rights seem both realistic and inevitable.27 This made it possible for AFSCME in
Wisconsin to wage its lengthy and ultimately successful campaign.
D. AFSCME Nationally.
AFSCME was chartered in 1936. It had emerged from the Wisconsin State
Administrative Employees Association, which was established in 1932.28 AFSCME’s growth
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was stunning. In 1936, it had 5,355 members; in 1946, it claimed 78,164.29 This rose to more
than 100,000 in 1954. By 1959, with about 200,000 members, AFSCME was the twentieth
largest of the AFL-CIO’s 125 unions; by 1961, with 210,000 members, AFSCME was
eighteenth. Contrary to the image of government employees as white-collar bureaucrats, in
1959 about 70 percent of AFSCME’s membership were blue-collar workers.30
AFSCME had called for formal bargaining and organizing rights as far back as its 1936
convention, but by the mid-1950s, AFSCME was putting more emphasis on bargaining. In 1957,
Zander wrote that AFSCME had “begun to seek true collective bargaining, with contracts
wherever and whenever possible.” In 1959, Zander insisted that “collective bargaining has
emerged. . . as both the most effective operating tool this union possesses and the right we
must struggle hardest to win.”31
This program required changes in the law. In 1955, AFSCME asked the newly merged
AFL-CIO to help pass state statutes granting organizing and bargaining rights, and in 1958,
AFSCME announced a major push for such laws. The union had experienced limited success at
the local level. In 1955, Philadelphia adopted a civil service regulation authorizing agreements
with AFSCME Council 33 as the collective bargaining agent. In 1958, AFSCME Council 37
helped convince New York City Mayor Robert Wagner, Jr., to sign Executive Order 49, which
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gave municipal workers organizing and bargaining rights.32 But AFSCME wanted state laws,
insisting that recognition and bargaining rights were “the central need of the union.” AFSCME
made international comparisons, noting that in seven of Canada’s ten provinces, there was “no
distinction” between private sector and municipal workers; public employees had the right to
organize, bargain, and even strike. The “issue of legal sovereignty. . . does not seem to have
become a factor.” Also, in England, the “problem” of public sector bargaining and organizing
“simply does not exist. . . . There are no special laws” for public employees. “They are
governed by the same laws. . . as everyone else.” Arbitration had been the norm since 1919;
strikes were legal, but arbitration worked so well that strikes were “few and far between.”33
E. AFSCME in Wisconsin.
Fittingly, AFSCME’s first success at passing a state law would be in the state in which
AFSCME was born. In 1938, there were around 6,000 members of AFSCME in Wisconsin;
there were 12,000 by 1960, about 8 percent of Wisconsin’s public workforce. Beyond their
numbers, AFSCME became a potent political force. AFSCME members were fairly equally
divided between the local government workers in the Wisconsin Council of County and
Municipal Employees (WCCME), which became AFSCME Council 40, and AFSCME’s State
Employees Council. The county and municipal employees in the WCCME were the force
behind the public sector labor laws. In 1951 the WCCME claimed seventy-nine locals, and by
1958 it had ninety-seven, spread among nearly all of the major cities and most of the counties in
Wisconsin. In 1956, the WCCME had 4,500 members; and by 1960, 6,000. Many WCCME
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members worked on highway construction projects, as Wisconsin undertook massive road
improvement and construction programs in the 1950s.34
The WCCME was always active in politics and related forms of bargaining. The
WCCME’s paper, the Union News, quoted Samuel Gompers: “There is not an action which the
unions take, whether it be an increase of wages, [or] an hour more leisure. . . without it being at
the same time a political act.” The WCCME engaged in informal bargaining well before any law
authorized it; for example, it claimed that “negotiations” with the Kenosha County Board in
1948 had yielded, among other things, a work week reduced to forty hours. As early as 1949,
WCCME locals met to discuss “bargaining techniques. . . and the nature of requests to be made
to county boards.” Some agreements were written and signed by both parties. Through the
1950s, the WCCME touted significant successes from such processes; in 1950, Local 655,
Jefferson County Highway Employees, had a signed agreement providing for a guaranteed work
week, vacations, and arbitration. In 1956, the Union News declared that “negotiations with
management are carried on so smoothly that it is almost like regular business meetings.”
Tellingly, however, the WCCME also referred to its practices as “petitioning.” Certainly this
“bargaining” had a different meaning than it had in the private sector. For example, one local
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appointed a seven-member “bargaining committee” which simply lobbied the Kenosha County
Highway Board (successfully) for a pay increase.35
The WCCME’s influence grew and informal bargaining spread. In the mid-1950s, of the
state’s seventy-one county highway departments (which employed around 6,000 workers) fortyseven had unions, thirty-one recognized their union as some form of bargaining agent, and
eighteen had contracts or written agreements with unions. In 1955, out of forty-nine towns with
populations of more than 5,000 responding to a poll, thirty-four had at least some unionized
employees. Most of these (outside fire departments) were in AFSCME. Fifteen towns did some
bargaining, and twenty-eight of the remaining thirty-four reported “informal” union participation
in wage determinations. Ten towns had entered into a written agreement with their employees.
On the other hand, highlighting historical objections to reform dating to the Boston police strike,
four towns stated that they denied police the right to affiliate with the AFL or CIO.36
AFSCME was not satisfied, noting in1956 that wages and hours in the public sector were
worse than in private employ. WCCME Executive Director Robert Oberbeck claimed that the
majority of AFSCME members made less than $1.40 an hour, while the average wage for
production workers in the state was $2.02. He also claimed that employees in sixty-seven of the
seventy-one county highway departments worked forty-five to sixty hour weeks, while the
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average in private industry was less than forty-two hours. Moreover, sixty county highway
departments paid no premium for overtime. Also, Oberbeck argued that in Wisconsin, a number
of local government employers discriminated against union supporters.37
Meanwhile, significant opposition to public sector labor rights remained. In 1943,
Milwaukee garbage workers not affiliated with the labor movement had struck for several days,
alarming the public. The Milwaukee Journal called for a law formally outlawing public sector
strikes, and it remained skeptical of labor in government employment through the 1950s. In
1953, after AFSCME organized a union of Milwaukee County deputy sheriffs, the local civil
service commission banned the union, citing fears of worker loyalties being divided between
their union and their government employer. AFSCME took this to court and lost. In 1956,
Milwaukee’s city attorney opined that collective bargaining would constitute an improper
delegation of legislative power.38 AFSCME knew it needed new legal rules in the form of a new
state law.
F. Wisconsin’s Employment Laws and Politics.
Through the New Deal, Wisconsin had been a pioneer in employment legislation. It was
the first state to enact a workers’ compensation law in 1911, and it helped lead the way on
unemployment compensation, industrial safety, and child labor. This was due to progressive
movements in the state: most famously, the Republican party’s progressive wing, led by
governors Robert LaFollette, Sr., and Philip LaFollette; the strong and politically active state
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AFL and CIO; and the close relationship of the University of Wisconsin to state government.
The university was home to key industrial pluralists, such as John Commons and William
Leiserson, who were central to New Deal labor policy. The American Association for Labor
Legislation was organized in Madison in 1907 and later had its headquarters in Commons’s
office in the Wisconsin State Historical Library.39
The Wisconsin Labor Relations Act of 1937, modeled on the NLRA, was the first state
labor statute. It applied only to private employers, and it was administered by a three-member
board (with members representing employers, labor, and the public) called the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board (WERB). The Wisconsin Industrial Commission, which handled
workers’ compensation and other employment laws, also had authority to mediate and arbitrate
private sector labor disputes. But no state agency or statute regulated unions in government
employment, and the history of legislative action on that topic was scant: In 1923, the Wisconsin
Assembly had debated but did not pass a bill that would have made it illegal for any public
worker to belong to a union.40
Also, after the New Deal, in Cling’s words, the state took a “conservative view” of labor
legislation While ranking around tenth in the nation in industrialization, Wisconsin also had a
strong agricultural industry that pushed for restrictive labor laws. The Progressive party fell
apart after the pivotal elections of 1938, in which LaFollette lost the governor’s seat and many
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other progressives were swept out of office. This election led to traditional Republican control
of practically all arms of state government until 1958. Republicans held the governorship from
1939 to 1959, along with the offices of lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, and
attorney general (except from 1948 to 1951, when Democrat Thomas Fairchild was attorney
general). And Republicans controlled both houses of the state assembly in this era.41
The rights of public sector unions would be a central battleground for a recovering
Democratic party and the dominant Republicans in the 1950s. After the demise of the
Progressives, liberal groups reorganized as Democrats. Labor was the most important of these
constituencies, and labor and the Democrats increasingly looked to each other for support, which
helped AFSCME. In contrast, the Republican leadership from the late 1930s through the 1950s
was dominated by industrialists such as Thomas Coleman, president of the Madison-Kipp
Corporation, and Governor Walter Kohler. The party was hardly friendly to labor or public
workers. William Thompson, a leading historian of Wisconsin, wrote that from 1947 to 1957, it
was “painful for many Republicans” to realize that public employment was increasing and that
public employees would not work at “servant’s wages. . . . Anathema to such Republicans was
the possibility that these public employees would form unions.”42
The legal rights of public sector unions became a recurring issue. In 1938, Wisconsin
attorney general Orlando Loomis found “no rule of law that would prohibit governmental
employees from. . . organizing,” and the city attorney of Milwaukee declared organizing
lawful. But then in 1940, Republican Attorney General John Martin wrote that in the absence of
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specific statutory authority, public employers could not enter into collective bargaining
agreements. In 1947, the Wisconsin Chamber of Commerce sponsored a bill that provided for
discharge, fines, and imprisonment of government employees who struck. It did not pass, but a
bill restricting strikes against public utilities did. This latter statute also provided collective
bargaining rights for public utility workers, but the U.S. Supreme Court held that the NLRA preempted that provision. Also in 1947, the legislature rejected a bill that would have given
government workers the right to organize and limited bargaining rights. In 1949, AFSCME,
while claiming credit for defeating the strike bill, added that it would be “in large measure a
success” simply to keep “anti-public employee legislation from passing.”43
AFSCME tried to bend the law on the books to fit the reality of public sector organizing
on the ground. The union made some use of the WERB, the state agency overseeing private
sector labor matters. The WERB had no formal jurisdiction in the public sector, but it would still
conduct representation elections in the public sector if both a government employer and a union
requested it to do so, even though such elections were not legally binding. Also, if both sides
requested, WERB would assign mediators or fact finders to help governments and unions resolve
differences. So, for example, in the summer of 1950, WERB held a representation election for
city workers in Mensasha, which AFSCME Local 1035 won, and in 1949 the Two Rivers City
Employees Local requested WERB intervention in its wage dispute with the city. But these
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limited procedures required atypically agreeable employers. In 1956, Council 48 requested a
formal collective bargaining contract with Milwaukee, noting that 2,700 of the city’s employees
were union members. AFSCME national president Zander came to Milwaukee to lobby for the
cause. But the city merely referred the matter to its attorney for advice, and there the matter
died.44 AFSCME realized it needed a state law that would bind even anti-union employers.
II. Learning Lessons and Focusing the Issues: Battles over Bills from 1951-57.
A. The 1951 Bill and the Fear of Police Strikes.
The struggle for reform started in earnest in 1951 with a bill introduced by the WCCME,
and it would continue for decades. The initial attempt in 1951 foundered on rocks frustratingly
familiar to public sector activists: the historically-based fear of police strikes.
Union attorney John Lawton, a shrewd strategist, was central to the campaign. Lawton
graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1942 and served as an assistant
district attorney for Dane County, Wisconsin, from 1942 to 1946. While in that job, he became
president of AFSCME Local 720 (Dane County Employees). Lawton was the WCCME’s
executive secretary-treasurer from 1944 through the 1950s. He also acted as its legislative
representative in Madison and provided legal counsel to it and other public sector unions in
Wisconsin from the late 1940s into the 1970s. While in private practice, Lawton briefly was a
partner of future governor Gaylord Nelson, the man who would ultimately sign Wisconsin’s first
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public sector statute into law. In the late 1940s, Lawton began calling for a state law granting
public workers the rights to organize and bargain.45
In early 1951, Lawton drafted Bill 462-S for the WCCME.46 The bill covered municipal
employees (employees of cities, towns, villages, counties, school boards, or other subdivision of
the state). It provided a clear right to organize (giving employees the right to “form and join
labor organizations of their own choice”), but, consistent with ambivalence of the time, was
vague regarding bargaining. The bill stated that its purpose was to promote “collective
considerations” and to “encourage mutual understandings” concerning wages, hours, and
working conditions. “Collective considerations” were defined as “the study. . . of terms or
conditions of employment in a mutually genuine effort to reach an agreement.” There was only
limited recourse in case of a bargaining impasse. If collective considerations failed to produce
an agreement, then either party could petition the WERB for a conciliator. The bill did not
propose formal collective bargaining along private sector lines, probably because of the opinion
of Vernon Thomson, the Republican attorney general and future governor, indicating that
collective bargaining contracts in the public sector would violate anti-delegation rules. The bill
also made it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with the rights that the bill
provided.47
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The legislative battle that followed featured the interest groups and arguments common in
debates over public sector labor rights before and after. The fight focused especially on the issue
of police strikes, but it also foreshadowed new, practical issues involving the precise scope of
union rights and the power of state labor agencies over local governments. Organized public
employers, the Wisconsin County Boards Association and the League of Wisconsin
Municipalities, opposed the bill, as did private sector business interests such as the state
Chamber of Commerce and the Wisconsin Manufacturers Association. Opponents successfully
sponsored an amendment that dropped the concept of “collective considerations” and added
language stating that the bill did not confer a right to strike. The WCCME unsuccessfully tried
to amend the bill to clarify that the WERB had some enforcement powers: the power to
investigate complaints of violations of the law and issue findings of fact and recommendations.
The state senate then passed the bill. In the state assembly, AFSCME defeated an amendment
that would have eliminated police and fire personnel from the bill’s coverage.48
Even though the bill stated that it did not grant a right to strike, opponents stressed that
issue and related fears. The Wisconsin State Journal raised the classic specter of the police
strike, agreeing with A. J. Thelen, the executive secretary of the Wisconsin County Boards
Association, that the bill should explicitly bar strikes and exclude law enforcement. Lawton
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replied truthfully that there had never been a strike of police or firefighters in Wisconsin and that
the rules of the relevant unions barred such actions. This fear, however, would prove fatal.49
The WCCME termed the right to organize “a basic right of citizenship,” but also tried
making milder, politically palatable appeals. The WCCME explained that the bill “does not
require that the employer must give anything to his employees–it simply says they must talk to
them about their problems.” The WERB could conciliate but it could not force the parties to
agree. Appealing to modern sentiments that at least tolerated public sector unions, Lawton
focused on specific instances of discrimination against workers for union activity. Still, he felt
compelled to answer older objections. Lawton stressed that by “no stretch of the imagination”
could the bill be interpreted to permit strikes, that AFSCME required the constitutions of its
police locals to bar strikes, and that no AFSCME police local had ever struck.50
The final version of the bill retained the right to organize, but the proto-bargaining and
enforcement provisions were weakened even further. The concepts of “collective
considerations” and “mutual understandings” were replaced with the even less specific idea of
promoting “better relations” between the parties. Conciliation by the WERB was limited to
situations in which both parties (as opposed to either party), requested it. The WERB could
investigate alleged violations of the law and issue findings of fact and recommendations, but the
recommendations were not binding and there were no sanctions for ignoring them. AFSCME
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did succeed in keeping coverage of police and fire services, and while the bill stated that it did
not confer a right to strike, it did not specify penalties for striking. The bill thus amended passed
and was sent to the desk of Governor Walter Kohler, Jr.51
Walter Kohler was the governor of Wisconsin from 1951 to 1957. “Born to wealth and
power,” in Thompson’s words, Kohler was the son of leading businessman Walter Kohler, Sr.
(who served a term as governor during the 1920s). He had past ties to his family’s concern, the
Kohler Company, and he was not especially sympathetic to labor. For example, he praised the
Taft-Hartley Act and its “right to work” provisions as a “protection” for workers. Further, in
1951, Kohler had broken from tradition in his appointments to the WERB by replacing the labor
representative with a second public representative.52
AFSCME lobbied Kohler to sign the bill, appealing to notions of rights now well
established in the private sector. Hundreds of workers signed petitions stating that “public
employees should have the same right to organize and negotiate. . . as our fellow workers in
private industry.” Local 1436, Jackson County Highway Employees, wrote Kohler that although
“the county boards, the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, the State Chamber of Commerce
and the Wisconsin Association of Manufacturers are urging you to veto this bill, we believe this
is directly against the rights and privileges of the American way of life.” There should be “better
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understanding. . . through collective bargaining.” Local 407, City of LaCrosse Employees,
wrote that the bill would provide “a fair means” to discuss problems. Individual employees
echoed Lawton’s emphasis on anti-union discrimination. Highway employee Clayton Randorf
explained that his co-workers had been “pushed around” for union activities. Other smaller
public sector unions, such as the Wisconsin County Police and Police Radio Operators
Association, wrote Kohler in favor of the bill. The Wisconsin Paid Firemen’s Association
argued that the bill “is a natural for Wisconsin, which has long led the way” in progressive
legislation. Also, AFSCME president Zander wrote and telegraphed Kohler and even came to
Madison to meet with him to promote the bill.53
Opponents—including many local government officials and their organizations—replied
with arguments ranging from the old fears of police strikes and divided loyalty, to concerns
about local control, to more technical legal issues. Oliver Grootemaat, president of the Village
of Whitefish Bay, objected that the “mere elimination of one phrase could grant municipal
employees the right to strike” and that permitting police to organize “might place them in the
anomalous position of being called upon to police a strike called by a brother union.” Similarly,
the mayor of Wausau, Herbert Giese, argued that it was “very bad public policy” to permit police
to organize, because in a strike the labor movement would pressure police to favor the striking
union. The League of Municipalities, explicitly citing the Boston police strike (of more than
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thirty years earlier) added that allowing police to organize would undermine the “democratic
system” which “depends upon the unbiased and impartial enforcement of laws.” Another
opponent claimed that allowing police to join the labor movement would be the same as
“unionization of the army.” The League added another argument that would be central in future
debates: the state should not legislate in this area, but rather local officials should have complete
authority in labor matters. Indeed, the League argued, the bill would violate home rule
provisions of state laws. The League and others also raised delegation concerns about anything
approaching bargaining. But the police issue was central. A memo to Attorney General
Thomson stated that the main practical effect of the bill would be to allow police to organize, and
added that “there is a strong sentiment in many sections of the country against” this.54
Kohler vetoed the bill, objecting to the affiliation of police with labor and specifically
citing the need for police to maintain order in labor disputes. The Union News put the best spin
it could on this, stressing Kohler’s remark that “for the overwhelming majority of state and local
employees, the present laws and customs embrace the privilege of belonging to labor unions.”
Kohler’s objection was only to unionizing “employees in the uniformed services.”55
But while concerns about police, strikes, and the proper extent and enforceability of
bargaining rights remained, law and reality were becoming even more out of sync. The
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WCCME continued to grow, its locals continued to engage in limited negotiations, and the
WERB continued to help settle disputes in some public sector cases.56
B. The 1953 Bill and the Delegation Problem: Reform Meets Outmoded Legal
Doctrine.
AFSCME’s attempts in the next legislative session in 1953 foundered on the shoals of the
non-delegation doctrine. Beyond this legal objection, AFSCME also faced a rough political
terrain. In 1952, Kohler had been re-elected with 63 percent of the vote, the largest margin of
victory to that date in Wisconsin history. Further, the Union News described the 1953 legislature
as “generally unfavorable. . . toward public employees and toward labor generally.”57
Nonetheless, on February 11, 1953, the WCCME introduced Bill 210-S, which provided
that contracts between local government employers and unions with durations of up to one year
would be enforceable. “The biggest problem in public employment,” Lawton concluded in a
report to the WERB, was “the lack of machinery for effective negotiations.”58 But the entire
concept of public sector negotiations was still suspect due to the non-delegation doctrine. The
delegation doctrine held that collective bargaining with a union unconstitutionally delegated
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sovereign decision-making power to a private party–a union. A number of courts had used this
doctrine to block even limited bargaining in the public sector.59
The WCCME and other unions, including private sector labor bodies, once again squared
off against private and public employers in the League of Municipalities, the County Boards
Association, the Wisconsin Manufacturers Association, and the state Chamber of Commerce.
This time, opponents took a legalistic tack. The state senate solicited an opinion on the bill from
state Attorney General Thomson. Thomson said that the bill was probably unconstitutional on
non-delegation grounds because it would allow contracts that would restrict the discretion of
legislative bodies regarding governmental functions. Compensation of public workers was “a
legislative function” which “may not be surrendered or delegated” to private parties. Issues of
“wages and hours of employment–and probably most other working conditions normally dealt
with in collective bargaining agreements–involve the exercise of legislative functions.” Shortly
after receiving this opinion, the Senate indefinitely postponed the bill on a vote of seventeen to
fifteen. Most of the votes to kill the bill came from Republicans.60
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C. Intensified Struggle, Compromise Results: the 1955 Bill Calls for a Study.
The 1955 round of the battle produced at best a draw in the form of a promise to study
the issue. At the same time, the political struggle began to heat up. Kohler was re-elected in
1954, but this time with only 51 percent of the vote.61 The WCCME increased its political
activities. In December 1954, it held a legislative conference that attracted 150 delegates from
various unions to discuss strategies. The WCCME tried to craft a compromise with the League
of Municipalities, but the process broke down over whether a law should cover police, impasse
resolution (AFSCME wanted alternative mechanisms in exchange for a strike ban), and the
League’s insistence that a state law would violate home rule. Still, the League took this matter
seriously, cautioning local officials that to “avoid state interference in this essentially local
matter,” they must prove both willing and able “to handle their labor problems at home.”62
The WCCME introduced Bill 89-S on January 27, 1955. Like the 1951 bill, Bill 89-S
granted the right to organize and engage in “collective considerations” with employers, made
employer interference with such rights unfair labor practices, and provided for WERB
conciliation. Proponents of the bill at the hearings included an even greater range of private and
public sector unionists from the CIO and the AFL. Again, the League of Municipalities, the
County Boards Association, and the Chamber of Commerce led the opposition. Three key
amendments were adopted to address the concerns of opponents. First, the WCCME reluctantly
agreed to exclude law enforcement. Second, the concept of “collective considerations” was
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replaced with the phrase “better relations with unions through conferences and negotiations.”
Third, a clause was added stating explicitly that the law did not grant a right to strike.63
Both sides stressed points they believed would be politically appealing. Union opponents
argued that “home rule” principles should give individual public employers the discretion to ban
unions. The WCCME stressed that anti-union discrimination was wrong and that the bill would
only “interfere” with home rule to the extent that local governments were engaged in such
discrimination. Nor did the bill create a right to strike. The Chamber of Commerce pushed the
“divided loyalty” point, arguing that government, which was responsible for regulating business
and labor, was already pressured by private sector unions, and that such pressures should not
come from within the government as well. The Milwaukee Journal focused its opposition on the
concept of “negotiations.” Public workers already had sufficient influence, the paper objected; in
Milwaukee, they “sit in on discussions of wages, working conditions and other problems.”
Further, bargaining was incompatible with civil service rules.64
The senate rejected Bill 89-S on June 24, 1955, although the WCCME salvaged an
agreement providing for a study. Joint Resolution 81-S stated that in view of the controversies
over the rights of public workers to organize, whether the state should provide machinery for
handling bargaining impasses, and the related constitutional and policy questions, the Legislative
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Council should investigate and make a report to the 1957 legislature. The League of
Municipalities and Chamber of Commerce opposed even this, but it passed anyway.65
The WCCME bemoaned the power of its “two toughest opponents”: the Chamber and
the League, the latter of which was fighting “against granting some meager rights to its own
employees.” Further, labor as a whole was increasingly dissatisfied with Governor Kohler and
the Republicans. The president of the Wisconsin Federation of Labor declared that the 1955
session featured “the worst legislature since Wisconsin was incorporated as a state.” Still,
AFSCME optimistically noted that the WERB’s Advisory Committee had approved of Bill 89-S,
and their opinion “should have some weight with the Legislative Council.”66
D. Opponents of Reform Fight Back: The 1956 Study and the Attempt to Ban
Public Sector Unions.
Both sides jockeyed over the study, seeking political advantage. The Union News
stressed that government workers “were the only major group of employees in the state of
Wisconsin that has not been granted collective bargaining rights.” The Chamber of Commerce
replied with claims of divided loyalty: Public sector organizing was “a threat to maintaining
governmental functions available to all our people. . . . Loyalty of a public employee must be
to all the people and should never be simply to a labor official or organization.” The Chamber
also warned that labor’s political power would only increase with the merged AFL-CIO.67
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The debate turned much nastier, however, after a few public workers engaged in some
secondary activity in support of a private sector strike, prompting opponents to call for a ban on
all public sector unions. In July 1955, during a strike by private sector workers at the Kohler
Company, some municipal employees at the Milwaukee docks represented by AFSCME
temporarily refused to unload some goods destined for Kohler. Ship owners filed secondary
boycott charges under the NLRA, but the National Labor Relations Board dismissed the charges
on the grounds that the NLRA did not apply to the public sector. In reaction, on August 6, 1956,
the Chamber of Commerce called on the Legislative Council to recommend laws that would bar
public workers from forming AFL-CIO affiliated unions. Chamber representative Joseph Fagan
used this event to bolster his argument that public workers “should owe their loyalty to all the
people and not simply the big merged AFL-CIO.”68
The Union News responded that the Chamber was “attempting to get revenge” and “to
cripple public employee unions.” The secondary action was an “isolated case.” Lawton
predicted the Chamber’s proposal would be “soundly rebuffed” by the legislature. Needling, he
noted that AFSCME would never propose legislation denying businessmen the right to form
their own organizations. The Public Employee added that Fagan’s name “sounds like that of a
Dickens villain.” Still, labor took the threat seriously, and marshaled considerable forces against
it. George Haberman, president of the Wisconsin Federation of Labor, wrote a public letter
insisting that “the labor movement feels very strongly that public employees should be given the
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legal right to organize and bargain collectively,” and the Wisconsin Federation passed a
resolution pledging to “exert constant efforts” to enact laws to rectify the “discriminatory, unfair,
and un-American” legal status of public workers. Charles Schultz, president of the state CIO,
also publicly pledged “wholehearted support.” AFSCME Locals and national officers, including
President Zander, promised to help fight the Chamber’s “vicious attack.”69
Opponents displayed equal fervor. The Chamber issued a memo on November 20, 1956,
the day the Legislative Committee released its report, asking for a statewide referendum during
the April 1957 elections on the right to organize. “We are convinced that the Wisconsin people
will overwhelmingly support a prohibition of AFL-CIO affiliated labor unions in Wisconsin
government.” The memo emphasized “THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT.” Revealing the worries of some private employers,
Fagan added that the AFL-CIO merger would mean that labor would be “nearly a third party,”
which “could mean the end of our capitalistic system.” The League of Municipalities took a
more moderate and more successful tack, again stressing that the unionization of municipal
workers was a local concern, not a matter for state legislation. Robert Sundby, the League’s
legal counsel, also told the Legislative Council that municipal labor relations were generally
good and thus no law granting rights to unions was needed.70
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The Legislative Council’s report of November 20, 1956, reflected contemporary attitudes
that increasingly tolerated public sector unions, but had not yet worked out what rights they
should have. The Council noted that in Wisconsin, government employees (except, in some
cases, police) were usually allowed to form unions. Prohibiting all public workers from joining
unions would be “unreasonable and extreme.” But, the report continued, while “agreements”
with these unions were legal, “contracts” were not; exclusive bargaining, compulsory arbitration,
strikes, and pickets could not be permitted in public employment; and “no serious state-wide
problem” existed in government labor relations. Also, as the League had argued, the Council
concluded that because the “home rule principle” had produced “generally satisfactory labor
relations. . . , state dictation of a labor policy would be unwise.”71
The Union News promised that AFSCME would “continue to press for legislation” and
that “political action at the local level will ultimately give us success!” Lawton emphasized that
“the only remedy. . . is a political one.”72
E. Partisan Politics: The 1957 Bill Is Tabled.
The year 1957 saw more delays, but an increasing probability that reform could happen
through political action. In 1957, the WCCME tried compromising from the start by excluding
law enforcement. Otherwise, Bill 235-S was familiar. It provided the rights to organize and be
represented by unions “in conferences and negotiations” with employers about “wages, hours,
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and conditions of employment.” The WERB could appoint conciliators and then fact-finders to
help resolve disputes. Again, Lawton appealed to evolving sensibilities. The bill was necessary
because “a substantial minority” of employers opposed unionization through “threats of
discharge, demotion, and other forms of discrimination.” Again, the main opposition came from
the League of Municipalities, the County Boards Association, and the Chamber of Commerce.73
The bill was killed in committee by a highly partisan vote. A motion to release the bill to
the full senate failed seventeen votes to fifteen, with all seventeen “nays” coming from
Republicans (ten of the fifteen “ayes” came from Democrats). The WCCME now turned its full
attention to politics. “If we ever needed proof that political organization and political action are
absolutely necessary,” WCCME executive director Oberbeck fumed, this “Chamber of
Commerce dominated legislature” provided it. The Union News listed the votes of senators on
the bill, telling its readers: “Study it carefully! Find out who is friend and who is foe. Clip it out
and carry it in your billfold. When you see your state senator, pull out the roll call to see how he
voted.”74
Crucially, the WCCME was finally in a position both to help cause political change at the
state level and to take advantage of it. “Public employees are steadily growing in influence,” the
Union News noted. “With each succeeding legislative session we are listened to with a more
attentive ear.” A more objective source, the Waukesha Freeman, observed in late 1957 that the
“public employees of Wisconsin are beginning to flex their political muscles” and were
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“organized more effectively each year.” The “public employee lobby can be a formidable one.”
AFSCME focused on elections. In October 1958, Oberbeck, protesting anti-union firings in a
county highway department, insisted that the legislation was the only solution. With the
following month’s elections obviously in mind, he recalled the veto of the 1951 bill by “your
present governor” and later bills blocked by “influential opponents in the legislature.” He told
AFSCME supporters to ask their representatives about organizing and collective bargaining
rights. If a representative was opposed, “don’t vote for him.” The Union News regularly urged
similar political action. “With this kind of activity at the local level,” the Union News concluded
prophetically, “we will succeed in the 1959 session of the legislature.”75
III. The 1959 Law: Democrats in Power and Reform at Last.
A. The 1959 Bill Becomes Law.
The elections of 1958 produced a key change in this long drama. For the first time in
decades, Wisconsin elected a Democratic governor, Gaylord Nelson, and a Democratic state
assembly. Nelson defeated Vernon Thomson, who had succeeded Kohler. Nelson was much
more friendly toward unions than his predecessors had been. He had worked in Lawton’s law
firm and served as a field representative for the WCCME. The Public Employee enthused that
Nelson had “compiled an outstanding record as a legislator.” For example, unlike Kohler,
Nelson had opposed “right to work” laws. Further, 1958 was the first time Democrats had won a
majority in the state assembly since 1932. Indeed, from 1947 and 1957, Republicans had at least
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a two-thirds majority in both houses of the state legislature in every year except 1955, when they
held “only” sixty-four of the assembly’s one hundred seats. Now Democrats had a fifty-five to
forty-five advantage in the assembly. Democrats also won back the offices of lieutenant
governor, attorney general, and state treasurer. They even gained three state senate seats,
although Republicans retained a twenty to thirteen majority there.76
Sudden and important as the political shift was, the forces driving it had long been in
motion, and unions were a central factor. State Republicans had been increasingly divided over
issues ranging from legislative reapportionment (along “one person, one vote” lines) to anticommunism, and riven by internal factions. In 1958, Thomson was saddled with Republican
support of the unpopular ideas of creating a sales tax and making Wisconsin a “right to work”
state, along with a recession in which 90,000 Wisconsinites had lost their jobs. Meanwhile, by
the mid-1950s the Democrats had become revitalized, with the help of former Progressive
Republicans, including Nelson and future Democratic attorney general John Reynolds, and also
labor. Democrats were increasingly successful at fusing their pro-labor ideals with a sizeable
portion of Wisconsin’s farm vote. The 1954 election produced the largest gains for the
Democrats since the end of the war. In 1957, E. William Proxmire won the special election for
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senator to replace Joe McCarthy after his death. Proxmire was Wisconsin’s first Democratic
senator since 1939, and the Democratic party had returned to respectability.77
Unions provided crucial money and manpower to these Democratic victories. In the mid1950s, labor contributed from 25 to 33 percent of the money received by the state party, union
political action committees made additional independent expenditures, and labor provided the
mass of volunteers in voter registration drives and phone banks. “The triumph of the Democratic
party in the late 1950s would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, without these various
contributions of the unions,” Thompson explains.78
Labor also helped turn the growth in the cities and decline in the farm population into a
political advantage through reapportionment. Wisconsin was one of only two states at the time
that gave equal weight to urban and rural districts. Thus in 1950, while Wisconsin’s urban areas
held 55 percent of the population, a working majority in both state legislative houses still
represented rural areas. Large farm interests were often suspicious of unions, and urban
Republicans tended to be less anti-labor. Powerful Republican Assemblyman Alfred Ludvigsen,
representing the rural northen half of Waukesha County, complained that “both Republicans and
Democrats elected in the big cities vote for labor bills.” Tensions around legislative
reapportionment heightened in the 1950s as urban areas grew by nearly 26 percent while the
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rural population grew by only 1 percent. Finally, after various battles, a reapportionment plan
was adopted based on population, becoming effective with the election of the 1955 legislature.79
Meanwhile, the WCCME continued to try to devise an acceptable public sector statute,
learning from its past defeats. In late 1958, it held a legislative conference that called for
bargaining rights for all local government workers except law enforcement. The WERB could
engage in mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, arbitration, or other services, if both parties
consented. The WCCME stressed the reasonableness of its proposal. It would be unfair to ban
strikes without some alternative for settling negotiating disputes. Basic organizing and
bargaining rights did not usurp the government’s sovereignty, Oberbeck insisted, and
“sovereign” power should be accountable “to the people it represents.” Lawton noted that the
WERB had already successfully conducted elections and offered non-binding mediation and
arbitration in the public sector, and thus it could safely be given such powers in a statute.80
Democratic victories did not ensure enactment of AFSCME’s agenda. Even those
generally sympathetic to public sector unions were unsure of the scope of formal rights that
should be granted, and powerful forces still opposed any such rights. Thus AFSCME’s Bill 309A, introduced on February 26, 1959, contained compromises designed to help it pass. To
counter objections of unconstitutional delegation and improper state control over local
governments, the bill specified that the WERB would have the power to conduct representation
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elections and do mediation and voluntary arbitrations only if both parties agreed. The bill again
excluded public safety personnel. Beyond that, it again provided for the right to organize and the
right for unions to engage in “conferences and negotiations” about “wages, hours, and conditions
of employment.” A modified version of the bill became law, but only after a lengthy struggle.81
AFSCME took advantage of new attitudes by characterizing traditional objections as
outdated. After the Milwaukee Sentinel complained that collective bargaining would “mark the
end of unprivileged, non-partisan government,” Zander replied that “like those who once
opposed child-labor laws and social security, the men of little minds today are fighting a rearguard action.” State senator Kirby Hendee (R-Milwaukee) introduced Bill 47-S, which would
have mandated harsh penalties for strikers, and the Union News turned this into an argument for
AFSCME’s bill. Any such law that did not provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
“is not fair. A union must have a way of getting its grievances and requests acted upon.”
AFSCME again made the moderate argument that the bill was needed because “a substantial
minority” continued to discriminate against union supporters.82
The hearings on the bills were hotly contested, with unusually large numbers registering
in favor and in opposition.83 It soon appeared that the WCCME’s bill was more viable than
Hendee’s: more than 150 people registered in favor of it and around 45 registered against it;
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whereas only nine registered in favor of Hendee’s bill and 85 registered against it. Lawton
argued that the issues were whether public employers could discriminate against pro-union
workers, and whether public employees could have dispute-resolution machinery. The
Wisconsin AFL-CIO strongly supported the WCCME’s bill.84
The WCCME was willing to make further compromises. The WERB’s Advisory
Committee was initially evenly split on the bill, with the six labor representatives favoring it and
the six employer representatives in opposition. But after WERB chair Laurence Gooding said
that a majority would support the bill if clauses were added providing for union unfair labor
practices and stating that employees had the right to refrain from union activities, the WCCME
quickly agreed to such amendments.85
AFSCME focused its rhetoric on the politically popular right of association and
intensified its efforts on the ground. Public employers in the League of Municipalities and the
County Boards Association had organized, AFSCME argued; how could they maintain that it
was “unconstitutional, morally wrong, and bad “ for public workers to do likewise? In senate
testimony, Lawton cited cases of anti-union discrimination and again stressed the need for
dispute resolution machinery. Oberbeck urged political action, sensing victory. “Now is the
time for every union member . . . to buttonhole their assemblyman and senator and tell him that
you want favorable action on bill 309-A.” Pointing out that legislators were usually home at
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weekends, Oberbeck suggested that members “[g]et your legislative committee or your whole
local together and make a trip over to your legislator’s home” to discuss the bill. Indeed, a
history of Wisconsin labor states that “[l]egislators at home on weekends were deluged with
visits by the local public employees” supporting the bill. Oberbeck also recommended a letterwriting campaign. The WCCME was “standing on the threshold of a new era” and this
legislative “Bill of Rights” was its “top goal.”86
The League of Municipalities countered with its own moderate and previously successful
arguments. The League claimed it did not oppose unionization per se, but state powers over
local governments in this area were both bad policy and unconstitutional. “State control” by the
WERB represented “unwarranted interference with municipal employee labor relations.” The
“prospect of an elected municipal official being called by subpoena to justify the exercise of his
legislative discretion before a state agency” in a ULP hearing was “completely repugnant.”
While mediation and arbitration were voluntary under the bill, the League (correctly) predicted
that unions would later try to make such procedures mandatory. The League also cited former
attorney general Thomson’s opinion that “there was grave doubt of the constitutionality” of
collective bargaining. The mediation and arbitration provisions were also unconstitutional
delegations, because while engaging in the process was voluntary, the results would be binding,
and Thomson’s opinion had disapproved of restricting the “free exercise of discretion” of public
officials in labor matters. Pay and working conditions of public employees were “legislative
functions” that could not be delegated. The League publicized a Milwaukee Journal editorial

86

Union News, April 1959, 4; id., May 1959, 1, 4; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, June 1959, 11;
45

predicting (correctly) that unions would use this bill “as a wedge” for further bargaining rights,
“which the courts have consistently held to be beyond the authority” of local governments.
Various local public employers echoed these complaints. Racine’s city counsel wrote Nelson
that he had “very serious doubt as to the constitutionality” of the bill; further, it was “one step
closer to recognition of the right of public employees to strike.”87
The bill passed, albeit after further concessions. The original bill carried by a vote of 67
to 23 in the assembly, with all dissenting votes cast by Republicans. On July 23, the senate
adopted a Republican amendment deleting the provisions authorizing the WERB to aid in
elections, bargaining impasses, and arbitration of grievances. However, the senate rejected an
amendment by Hendee that would have provided for harsh penalties for strikers. With the
powers of the state agency WERB reduced, the delegation issue was apparently sufficiently
diluted. The amended bill passed by 23 to 10 in the senate and then passed the assembly on a
voice vote. Governor Nelson, who had always supported the bill, signed it into law on
September 22. Attorney General Reynolds later told AFSCME that this law was won through
labor’s organization and efforts, but the friendly administration was crucial, as were various
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compromises, and, more broadly, the evolution in public attitudes caused in part by the actual
activities of public sector labor on the ground.88
AFSCME was jubilant over this seminal legal victory. Employees of local governments
(excluding police) for the first time anywhere had a statewide statutory right to organize and be
represented by unions in “conferences and negotiations” over wages, hours, and working
conditions. The Union News enthused that “the bill caps a long fight . . . to win for city and
county workers the same rights enjoyed by workers in private employment.” The law opened an
“enlightened era.” The national AFSCME lauded this “collective bargaining bill” that forbade
public employers from impeding the right to organize. Speaking mostly for private sector
unions, the Madison Union Labor News cheered that “[p]ublic employees of Wisconsin have
finally gained the right to join a union. . . without interference from their employers.” But
mindful of the significant compromises as to impasse and enforcement procedures, the WCCME
began looking ahead. The “legislative wheels in Wisconsin have been grinding for the last 13
years” on these issues, theUnion News observed. “Whether the Legislature has ground fine
enough may arouse considerable debate.”89
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B. Using the New Law: Victories and Discontents.
The 1959 law was a historical landmark that spurred innovations in other states and
facilitated improved labor relations in Wisconsin. Still, reflecting ongoing ambivalence about
the proper extent of union rights for public workers, it was still woefully unclear on the extent of
such rights. At first, bargaining seemed to be a success. In January 1960, the Union News
claimed that negotiations under the bill “have produced the expected gratifying results” and that
the law had promoted bargaining even where none had existed before. The Public Employee
reported “considerable gains through negotiations completed by 94 locals” in Wisconsin in a
variety of areas involving wages, hours, and conditions.90
But this was quite different from bargaining in the traditional private sector sense, and
public sector unions in Wisconsin still relied in substantial measure on the good will of the local
public employer. For example, the mayor of Madison, Ivan Nestingen, explained how
bargaining worked in that city. A city bargaining committee negotiated with the union, and then
a separate council of five aldermen made final decisions after considering the results of that
bargaining. While the city negotiated over pay, benefits, leave, medical insurance, and dues
check-off, it refused to bargain about promotions or what it termed “employment practices.”
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Bargaining resulted in an “agreement,” but not a written contract, because Madison’s city
attorney had indicated that written labor contracts were still illegal under current law.91
Given these limits and ambiguities, it is not surprising that Oberbeck was soon
complaining that “the law is not clear as to what the collective bargaining relationship should
be.” Again, AFSCME’s answer was political: revised legislation that clarified procedures on
bargaining and recognition. Oberbeck suggested that formal, written contracts should be the
norm, demurring that any “question of legality” of such contracts “is a purely academic one.”
The Union News urged locals to insist on written agreements. Far from a legal problem, they
were merely a “written record of what has been agreed to,” analogous to a bank statement. Also,
the WCCME called for amendments to specify enforcement and administrative procedures.
Although provisions regarding the WERB had been removed, that body would still sometimes
intervene in public sector matters. For example, in 1960, the WERB successfully mediated a
dispute over wages and hours between the Green County Highway Committee and AFSCME
Local 226. WERB member Arvid Anderson also called for amendments to clarify the WERB’s
authority in the public sector. The law “should be undergirded with enforcement procedures
either in a circuit court, or before this agency, and not left in a nebulous fashion.”92
Meanwhile, opponents of reform felt the law had already gone too far, and they now
looked to the 1960 governor’s race. In the fall of 1960, Nelson’s opponent, Philip Kuehn, issued
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a position paper that opposed all public sector bargaining, called for punitive measures for public
sector strikers (as in the old Hendee bill), and opposed extending organizing rights to public
safety workers. Adopting older visions of labor relations, Kuehn insisted that there could be no
right to bargain with the government because there was no right to strike against the government.
He even added that public workers beyond police and fire should be denied the right to organize
“in other situations” that risked “divided loyalty.”93
AFSCME fought back in the court of public opinion: “wealthy. . . men like Kuehn”
wanted to make “the working man. . . a second class citizen.” Lawton stressed new
understandings born in the public sector: the term “negotiations” in the 1959 law meant a type
of bargaining, and bargaining could exist without strikes. For example, arbitration could be used
to resolve bargaining impasses, as the ABA had suggested. Lawton vowed that AFSCME would
propose amendments in 1961 that would strengthen bargaining by providing for mediation,
conciliation, and fact-finding by the WERB. Nelson and Reynolds also argued that the WERB
should be more involved in the public sector, and that the legislature should clarify that the
WERB could normally be used in elections or ULP cases. Rejecting fears that organizing or
even bargaining necessarily meant strikes, Nelson added that the 1959 law did not provide a right
to strike, and if Kuehn wanted “jail sentences, I disagree.”94
In a sense, both Kuehn and AFSCME were wrestling with the same fundamental issue:
what should happen after a bargaining impasse if the union is not allowed to strike. Kuehn
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argued that with no right to strike, “collective bargaining is robbed of its mutuality,” and
therefore bargaining was impossible. AFSCME was also frustrated with a law that authorized
“negotiations” but provided no method to resolve impasses. Modern public sector labor law
provides a variety of answers to that question,95 but the Wisconsin experience was the first
attempt to deal with the issue seriously.
Still, AFSCME rightly claimed confidence in its political power as the November
elections neared. Asserting that public sector labor rights would be one of the hottest issues in
the election, the Union News concluded as to Kuehn that it was “a poor sailor indeed who does
not knoweth which way the wind bloweth.” AFSCME portrayed Kuehn’s program as a key
example of why public workers should be politically active: if Kuehn were elected and the
Republicans retained their senate majority, it would mean “second-class citizenship.” Wisconsin
had 25,000 organized government workers, the Union News claimed, and “every public
employee in the state must be at the polls” to vote “for candidates who are in favor of an
enlightened labor policy for public employees.” Governor Nelson, the Union News noted, was a
“friend of the public employee.96
Nelson won a second term as governor in 1960 and Reynolds won a second term as
attorney general. But Republican Warren Knowles recaptured the lieutenant governorship, the
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Republicans retook the state assembly (fifty-five to forty-five), and they kept a twenty to thirteen
majority in the senate.97 The stage was set for a battle over amendments to clarify the law,
specifically over state powers in the area of bargaining impasses.
IV. The 1962 Law and Continuing Debates in Public Sector Labor Relations.
A. The 1962 Law and State Enforcement.
The 1962 bill was designed to plug gaps in the 1959 law, and, along with that law,
constitutes the first example of state legislators seriously grappling with specific, modern issues
of public sector bargaining.
On March 2, 1961, the WCCME introduced Bill 336-A, the point of which was to grant
the WERB formal authority to enforce union rights and aid in bargaining. The original version
of the bill provided that the WERB could act as a mediator or an arbitrator in bargaining. To
blunt criticisms based on non-delegation and home rule concerns, the bill specified that
participation in arbitration would be voluntary, but WERB decisions in such voluntary
proceedings would be binding. Also, if negotiations reached an impasse, or if one side refused to
bargain in good faith, either party could ask the WERB to name a fact-finder who would make
recommendations. The bill provided that these procedures would also apply to public safety
personnel, including police. Also, either side could petition the WERB to conduct a
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representation election. Finally, the bill explicitly authorized written contracts.98 Opponents
again contested even this level of state involvement, resulting in another set of compromises that
was, nonetheless, another historic victory for labor.
Governor Nelson and leading Democrats supported the bill. Deputy Attorney General
Nathan Heffernan explained that the absence of procedures to implement the rights in the 1959
law had created confusion. Still, opposition was fierce. The assembly finally passed the bill by a
vote of sixty-four to fifteen in July, after adopting an amendment that expressly prohibited
strikes. Attempting to avoid further amendments in the senate, Lawton argued that the bill was
already modest: employers were not required to sign contracts or engage in arbitration, and
recommendations by fact-finders would be only advisory. But the senate then added
amendments which provided that arbitrations too would only advisory, and that fact-finding
would be allowed only if both parties agreed to it.99
Neither side was entirely satisfied with the amended bill. Lawton still wanted factfinding if either party requested it and binding arbitration if both sides were willing. Meanwhile,
opponents felt the bill violated principles of home rule and sovereignty. The League again raised
the specter of the WERB subpoenaing municipal officials, insisted that even voluntary, non-
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binding arbitration was of questionable constitutionality and would cause “chaos and discord.”
Various local public employers echoed that the bill would give the WERB too much power. The
Milwaukee Journal editorialized that the bill “ought to be killed,” because “[s]quaring
government sovereignty with the realities of employee-employer relations poses problems.” The
Wisconsin State Journal decried AFSCME’s political power, adding that “[p]ublic and private
employment are not the same and cannot be made so.” The duties of public officials “cannot be
delegated or shrugged off to some other body.” The Milwaukee Government Service League
objected that binding contracts violated the sovereign right of governments “to change their
minds without restriction.”100 But opponents had no clear alternatives, and the tide of reform
was too strong.
In contrast, labor succeeded by making specific, practical proposals and arguments. As
to the erosion of local authority, AFSCME responded that nothing in the bill prevented public
employers from making final decisions in bargaining. The bill did not require employers to
submit to arbitration and, as amended, the employer was not bound by arbitration decisions.
Local government already had to comply with state procedures in matters ranging from budgets
to taxes to street design, so the limited requirements of the labor bill were constitutional. The
Union News published excerpts from a Wisconsin Law Review article written by Arvid
Anderson. Public sector unions would continue to grow, Anderson explained, and absent
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adequate grievance and bargaining procedures, public sector labor disputes would increase. He
compared developments in the public sector to those in the private sector around the time the
NLRA was passed. Anderson suggested principles for state laws, mostly along the lines of what
AFSCME was advocating. Public sector unions should have the right to form written, binding,
contracts. Both unions and public employers should be required to bargain in good faith
concerning wages, hours, and working conditions. Strikes should be barred, and the parties
should instead use mediation, voluntary arbitrations, and advisory fact-finding.101
AFSCME’s political power was drawing notice. The WCCME “may well become any
day now the most potent of the lobbying forces in the state capitol,” wrote John Wyngaard, a
correspondent for several Wisconsin newspapers, in an article titled “Public Employee Union
Has Gained Real Political Power.” As to the WCCME’s bill, the union “has won a resounding,
even an embarrassingly decisive victory” in the assembly. “A dozen years ago, the county
boards could have knocked down such a rival power with scarcely a serious effort.” But public
sector unions have “grown rapidly and now represent a considerable voting power; they are well
led; and they promise to grow even more powerful.” Also contributing to the victory were the
compromises made; the expanded clout of public and private sector labor generally; and more
broadly, increased experience with public sector labor, which made it more difficult to link such
unions with strikes, bias, or other old nightmarish scenarios. In any case, the October 1961
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Public Employee called the new Wisconsin bill one of the most “enlightened labor legislation
bills” ever, and predicted a “bitter, showdown fight.”102
Again, both sides were forced to compromise. Thelen asked that the bill be deferred until
the 1963 legislative session. He cited editorials from relatively minor newspapers: the Marinette
Eagle Star (a “dangerous bill”) and the Appleton Post Crescent (“exhaustive study” still
required). Even the League acknowledged that the “pressures which have been brought to bear”
to pass the bill “are well known.” Still, opponents were able to attach further amendments, most
importantly eliminating the arbitration provisions entirely.103
Thus, the final bill provided for WERB mediation only if both parties requested it, but
allowed for WERB-conducted representation elections or fact-finding at the request of either
party. The fact-finder had the power to call hearings, issue subpoenas, and make non-binding
recommendations. Indicating how much the winds had shifted, the provision allowing coverage
of public safety personnel was retained, apparently with little controversy. The bill also required
contracts to be in writing. Strikes were “expressly prohibited,” but no penalties were specified.
On January 10, 1962, the Legislature approved Bill 336-A, and Governor Nelson signed it on
January 31.104
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This law represented “the culmination of nearly 15 years’ work” by AFSCME, beginning
with the defeat of the 1947 bill designed to punish strikers, Lawton proclaimed. The
amendments were “meaningless.” While the WERB could act as a mediator in bargaining and
ULP cases only if both parties agreed, effective mediation was only possible if both parties
agreed anyway. Further, either party could initiate fact-finding after a bargaining impasse or ask
the WERB to conduct a representation election. The WERB was not authorized to do
arbitrations, but employers could still agree to arbitrations conducted by other neutrals, such as
the American Arbitration Association. “We gained our basic objectives,” he insisted. Indeed, he
called the new law “the Magna Carta for public employees” and said it meant as much as the
NLRA did in private industry. For years, opponents had been “crying that public employees
should not have the right to strike,” the Union News exulted, but “they gave no alternative.” The
new law provides “a way to settle labor disputes successfully. . . mediation and fact finding.”
The Public Employee claimed the law provided “many of the collective bargaining rights now
afforded workers in private industry.” A later study concluded that this law “converted a
statement of policy [the 1959 law] into a functional process for true collective bargaining.”105
AFSCME had arrived, politically. Standing next to Governor Nelson at the signing
ceremony were AFSCME national vice president Steven Clark, WCCME vice president Harmon
Skown, and WCCME president Herb Einerson. Other public officials curried AFSCME’s favor.
At AFSCME’s state convention, Attorney General Reynolds hailed the law as a “giant step
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forward” born of the WCCME’s “tireless” campaign. “In the century-long struggle to protect the
rights of workers to bargain collectively with their employers, our public employees have been
ignored. These new laws put Wisconsin in a leadership position in the nation.” Reynolds was
running for governor in the 1962 elections against Kuehn and would win, with AFSCME’s
support. A month before the election, Reynolds stated that the “objective of the law is to provide
collective bargaining rights for municipal employees similar to that provided to employees in
private industry. With this objective I agree.”106
AFSCME linked the reform in Wisconsin law with an important victory at the national
level. On January 17, 1962, President John F. Kennedy signed Federal Executive Order 10988,
which gave limited bargaining rights to federal workers107 “The sea of public controversy over
the right of the public employee to belong to a labor union has been lapping against the dike of
adverse legislative and legal opinion in Wisconsin and throughout the United States,” the Union
News proclaimed. “The dike was breached in Wisconsin. . . . Recently, President Kennedy. .
. breached the dike again. . . . The public employee movement is here to stay and thus must be
dealt with realistically.”108
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B. Results Under the 1962 Law and Beyond.
The WCCME quickly took advantage of various aspects of the new law, especially the
WERB’s enforcement powers. On July 27, 1962, the WERB told the Green Lake County
Highway Commission to reinstate an employee fired because of anti-union discrimination. The
first fact-finder’s report involving AFSCME was issued on June 1, 1963, and the WCCME
happily announced that it recommended a seven-cent per hour raise for Local 678, DePere City
employees. Bargaining was improving. Oberbeck bragged that while in 1959 about 60 percent
of WCCME’s locals had signed contracts, by the fall of 1964 almost all had. Other public sector
unions in Wisconsin, such as the American Federation of Teachers, also took advantage of the
new law.109
AFSCME did encounter the limits of the new law as well, and fights over the scope of
rights would continue for decades. For example, the WCCME was greatly annoyed when
DePere City and some other employers simply rejected the fact-finders’ recommendations. The
Union News called for binding arbitration. In 1965 the law was expanded to extend limited
bargaining rights to state employees. In 1966, however, the WCCME suffered a setback when
the WERB held that the Wisconsin law did not actually impose a duty to bargain in good faith.110
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But by this time, legal reform on this issue had spread across the country. By 1966,
sixteen states had enacted laws extending at least some organizing and bargaining rights to at
least some public employees111 Struggles continued in other states and in Wisconsin. In 1967,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a public employer’s contractual agreement to submit
grievances to binding arbitration was not an unlawful delegation of the city’s legislative power.
In 1971, the WCCME won legislative amendments providing for binding arbitration impasse
procedures for firefighters and most police, requiring that both sides bargain in good faith, and
allowing “agency shop” union security agreements. In 1977, Wisconsin enacted a law (backed
by AFSCME) that provided for binding impasse arbitration for other local government
employees and authorized a very limited right to strike, providing a relatively definite answer to
the question both sides had struggled with for so long.112
Conclusion
The Wisconsin laws of 1959 and 1962 were both an opening salvo and a historic
watershed in Wisconsin and the nation.113 In 1966, Arvid Anderson wrote that the “fundamental
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question to be answered by this Wisconsin experiment is whether the principles and practices of
collective bargaining. . . can be transferred in whole or in part to public employment. . . .
[W]e think the tentative answer is ‘yes.’” Indeed, in 1968 Ed Johnson, the executive director of
the League of Municipalities, stated that “a pretty good law has been in effect for seven years
which might stand some minor touch-ups but certainly is not in need of major surgery.” Still,
Johnson made a point of adding that the “word ‘sovereignty’ may be archaic, but I know of no
better word to describe the responsibility elected officials have to their constituents. Such
responsibility cannot be shared with representatives of public employees.”114 Similar objections,
resonating with the history of public sector labor relations, are still made today, as disputes over
the proper extent of public sector bargaining, impasse resolution procedures, and related rights
have continued into the twenty-first century, still fought state-by- state, in legislatures. But after
the Wisconsin laws, the legal rights of workers, public sector labor relations, the labor movement
as a whole, and American politics have never been the same.
Even more broadly, this model of legal change represents some hope for liberals and
progressives unlikely to win sweeping victories from the federal government or courts in at least
the near term. Reforms in state legislation can have dramatic effects nation wide on politics and
human rights. But such changes do not happen overnight. Among the lessons of the Wisconsin
experience is that advocates of reform must simultaneously battle in the arenas of ideas, legal
doctrine, and old-fashioned ground-level politics. The results may not be instantaneous, but they
may eventually be rather astonishing.
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